Many modern databases include personal and sensitive correlated data, such as private information on users connected together in a social network, and measurements of physical activity of single subjects across time. However, differential privacy, the current gold standard in data privacy, does not adequately address privacy issues in this kind of data.
INTRODUCTION
Modern database applications increasingly involve personal data, such as healthcare, financial and user behavioral information, and consequently it is important to design algorithms that can analyze sensitive data while still preserving privacy. For the past several years, differential privacy [8] has emerged as the gold standard in data privacy, and there is a large body of work on differentially private algorithm design that apply to a growing number of queries [16, 22, 4, 31, 23, 32, 17, 5, 34] . The typical setting in these works is that each (independently drawn) record is a single individual's private value, and the goal is to answer queries on a * The first two authors contributed equally.
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SIGMOD'17, May 14 -19, 2017 , Chicago, IL, USA Many modern database applications, such as those involving healthcare, power usage and building management, also increasingly involve a different setting -correlated dataprivacy issues in which are not as well-understood. Consider, for example, a simple time-series application -measurement of physical activity of a single subject across time. The goal here is to release aggregate statistics on the subject's activities over a long period (say a week) while hiding the evidence of an activity at any specific instant (say, 10:30am on Jan 4). If the measurements are made at small intervals, then the records form a highly correlated time-series as human activities change slowly over time.
What is a good notion of privacy for this example? Since the data belongs to a single subject, differential privacy is not directly applicable; however, a modified version called entry-privacy [15] applies. Entry-privacy ensures that the inclusion of a single time-series entry does not affect the probability of any outcome by much. It will add noise with standard deviation ≈ 1 to each bin of the histogram of activities. While this is enough for independent activities, it is insufficient to hide the evidence of correlated activities that may continue for several time points. A related notion is group differential privacy [9] , which extends the definition to participation of entire groups of correlated individuals or entries. Here, all entries are correlated, and hence group differential privacy will add ≈ O(T ) noise to a histogram over T measurements, thus destroying all utility. Thus to address privacy challenges in this kind of data, we need a different privacy notion.
A generalized version of differential privacy called Pufferfish was proposed by [20] . In Pufferfish, privacy requirements are specified through three components -S, a set of secrets that represents what may need to be hidden, Q, a set of secret pairs that represents pairs of secrets that need to be indistinguishable to the adversary and Θ, a class of distributions that can plausibly generate the data. Privacy is provided by ensuring that the secret pairs in Q are indistinguishable when data is generated from any θ ∈ Θ. In the time-series example, S is the set of activities at each time t, and secret pairs are all pairs of the form (Activity a at time t, Activity b at time t). Assuming that activities transition in a Markovian fashion, Θ is a set of Markov Chains over activities. Pufferfish captures correlation in such applications effectively in two ways -first, unlike differential privacy, it can hide private values against correlation across multiple entries/individuals; second, unlike group privacy, it also allows utility in cases where a large number of individuals or entries are correlated, yet the "average amount" of correlation is low.
Because of these properties, we adopt Pufferfish as our privacy definition. To bolster the case for Pufferfish, we provide a general result showing that even if the adversary's beliefθ lies outside the class Θ, the resulting loss in privacy is low ifθ is close to Θ.
The main challenge in using Pufferfish is a lack of suitable mechanisms. While mechanisms are known for specific instantiations [20, 18, 35] , there is no mechanism for general Pufferfish. In this paper, we provide the first mechanism, called the Wasserstein Mechanism, that can be adopted to any general Pufferfish instantiation. Since this mechanism may be computationally inefficient, we consider the case when correlation between variables can be described by a Bayesian network, and the goal is to hide the private value of each variable. We provide a second mechanism, called the Markov Quilt Mechanism, that can exploit properties of the Bayesian network to reduce the computational complexity. As a case study, we derive a simplified version of the mechanism for the physical activity measurement example. We provide privacy and utility guarantees, establish composition properties, and finally demonstrate the practical applicability of the mechanism through experimental evaluation on synthetic as well as real data. Specifically, our contributions are as follows:
• We establish that when we guarantee Pufferfish privacy with respect to a distribution class Θ, but the adversary's beliefθ lies outside Θ, the resulting loss in privacy is small whenθ is close to Θ.
• We provide the first mechanism that applies to any Pufferfish instantiation and is a generalization of the Laplace mechanism for differential privacy. We call this the Wasserstein Mechanism.
• Since the above mechanism may be computationally inefficient, we provide a more efficient mechanism called the Markov Quilt Mechanism when correlation between entries is described by a Bayesian Network.
• We show that under certain conditions, applying the Markov Quilt Mechanism multiple times over the same database leads to a gracefully decaying privacy parameter. This makes the mechanism particularly attractive as Pufferfish privacy does not always compose [20] .
• We derive a simplified and computationally efficient version of this mechanism for time series applications such as physical activity monitoring.
• Finally, we provide an experimental comparison between Markov Quilt Mechanism and standard baselines as well as some concurrent work [14] ; experiments are performed on simulated data, a moderately-sized real dataset (≈ 10, 000 observations per person) on physical activity, and a large dataset (over 1 million observations) on power consumption.
Related Work
There is a body of work on differentially private mechanisms [28, 27, 4, 3, 7] -see surveys [30, 9] . As we explain earlier, differential privacy is not the right formalism for the kind of applications we consider. A related framework is coupled-worlds privacy [2] ; while it can take data distributions into account through a distribution class Θ, it requires that the participation of a single individual or entry does not make a difference, and is not suitable for our applications. We remark that while mechanisms for specific coupled-worlds privacy frameworks exist, there is also no generic coupled-worlds privacy mechanism.
Our work instead uses Pufferfish, a recent generalization of differential privacy [20] . [20, 18] provide some specific instances of Pufferfish frameworks along with associated privacy mechanisms; they do not provide a mechanism that applies to any Pufferfish instance, and their examples do not apply to Bayesian networks. [35] uses a modification of Pufferfish, where instead of a distribution class Θ, they consider a single generating distribution θ. They consider the specific case where correlations can be modeled by Gaussian Markov Random Fields, and thus their work also does not apply to our physical activity monitoring example. [24] designs Pufferfish privacy mechanisms for distribution classes that include Markov Chains. Their mechanism adds noise proportional to a parameter ρ that measures correlation between entries. However, they do not specify how to calculate ρ as a function of the distribution class Θ, and as a result, their mechanism cannot be implemented when only Θ is known. [33] releases time-varying location trajectories under differential privacy while accounting for temporal correlations using a Hidden Markov Model with publicly known parameters. Finally, [19] apply Pufferfish to smartmeter data; instead of directly modeling correlation through Markov models, they add noise to the wavelet coefficients of the time series corresponding to different frequencies.
In concurrent work, [14] provide an alternative algorithm for Pufferfish privacy when data can be written as X = (X1, . . . , Xn) and the goal is to hide the value of each Xi. Their mechanism is less general than the Wasserstein Mechanism, but applies to a broader class of models than the Markov Quilt Mechanism. In Section 5, we experimentally compare their method with ours for Markov Chains and show that our method works for a broader range of distribution classes than theirs.
Finally, there has also been some previous work on differentially private time-series release [25, 13, 29] ; however, they relate to aggregates over trajectories from a large number of people, unlike trajectories of single subjects as in our work.
THE SETTING
To motivate our privacy framework, we use two applications -physical activity monitoring of a single subject and flu statistics in a social network. We begin by describing them at a high level, and provide more details in Section 2.1.
Example 1: Physical Activity Monitoring. The database consists of a time-series X = {X1, X2, . . . , XT } where record Xt denotes a discrete physical activity (e.g, running, sitting, etc) of a subject at time t. Our goal is to release (an approximate) histogram of activities over a period (say, a week), while preventing an adversary from inferring the subject's activity at a specific time (say, 10:30am on Jan 4).
Example 2: Flu Status. The database consists of a set of records X = {X1, . . . , Xn}, where record Xi, which is 0 or 1, represents person i's flu status. The goal is to release (an approximation to) i Xi, the number of infected people, while ensuring privacy against an adversary who wishes to detect whether a particular person Alice in the database has flu. The database includes people who interact socially, and hence the flu statuses are highly correlated. Additionally, the decision to participate in the database is made at a group-level (for example, workplace-level or school-level), so individuals do not control their participation.
The Privacy Framework
The privacy framework of our choice is Pufferfish [20] , an elegant generalization of differential privacy [8] . A Pufferfish framework is instantiated by three parameters -a set S of secrets, a set Q ⊆ S × S of secret pairs, and a class of data distributions Θ. S is the set of possible facts about the database that we might wish to hide, and could refer to a single individual's private data or part thereof. Q is the set of secret pairs that we wish to be indistinguishable. Finally, Θ is a set of distributions that can plausibly generate the data, and controls the amount and nature of correlation. Each θ ∈ Θ represents a belief an adversary may hold about the data, and the goal of the privacy framework is to ensure indistinguishability in the face of these beliefs. Definition 2.1. A privacy mechanism M is said to bePufferfish private in a framework (S, Q, Θ) if for all θ ∈ Θ with X drawn from distribution θ, for all secret pairs (si, sj) ∈ Q, and for all w ∈ Range(M ), we have
when si and sj are such that P (si|θ) = 0, P (sj|θ) = 0.
Readers familiar with differential privacy will observe that unlike differential privacy, the probability in (1) is with respect to the randomized mechanism and the actual data X, which is drawn from a θ ∈ Θ; to emphasize this, we use the notation X instead of D.
Properties of Pufferfish
An alternative interpretation of (1) is that for X ∼ θ, θ ∈ Θ, for all (si, sj) ∈ Q, and for all w ∈ Range(M ), we have:
In other words, knowledge of M (X) does not affect the posterior ratio of the likelihood of si and sj, compared to the initial belief. [20] shows that Differential Privacy is a special case of Pufferfish, where S is the set of all facts of the form s i x = Person i has value x for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and x in a domain X , Q is set of all pairs (s i x , s i z ) for x and z in X with x = z, and Θ is the set of all distributions where each individual is distributed independently. Moreover, we cannot have both privacy and utility when Θ is the set of all distributions [20] . Consequently, it is essential to select Θ wisely; if Θ is too restrictive, then we may not have privacy against legitimate adversaries, and if Θ is too large, then the resulting privacy mechanisms may have little utility.
Finally, Pufferfish privacy does not always compose [20] -in the sense that the privacy guarantees may not decay gracefully as more computations are carried out on the same data. However, some of our privacy mechanisms themselves have good composition properties -see Section 4.3 for more details.
A related framework is Group Differential Privacy [9] , which applies to databases with groups of correlated records.
Definition 2.2 (Group Differential Privacy).
Let D be a database with n records, and let G = {G1, . . . , G k } be a collection of subsets Gi ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. A privacy mechanism M is said to be -group differentially private with respect to G if for all Gi in G, for all pairs of databases D and D which differ in the private values of the individuals in Gi, and for all S ⊆ Range(M ), we have:
In other words, Definition 2.2 implies that the participation of each group Gi in the dataset does not make a substantial difference to the outcome of mechanism M .
Examples
We next illustrate how instantiating these examples in Pufferfish would provide effective privacy and utility.
Example 1: Physical Activity Measurement. Let A be the set of all activities -for example, {walking, running, sitting} -and let s t a denote the event that activity a occurs at time t -namely, Xt = a. In the Pufferfish instantiation, we set S as {s t a : t = 1, . . . , T, a ∈ A} -so the activity at each time t is a secret. Q is the set of all pairs (s t a , s t b ) for a, b in A and for all t; in other words, the adversary cannot distinguish whether the subject is engaging in activity a or b at any time t for all pairs a and b. Finally, Θ is a set of time series models that capture how people switch between activities. A plausible modeling decision is to restrict Θ to be a set of Markov Chains X1 → X2 → . . . → XT where each state Xt is an activity in A. Each such Markov Chain can be described by an initial distribution q and a transition matrix P . In this example,
• Differential privacy does not directly apply since we have a single person's data.
• Entry differential privacy [15, 20] and coupled worlds privacy [2] add noise with standard deviation ≈ 1/ to each bin of the activity histogram. However, this does not erase the evidence of an activity at time t. Moreover, an activity record does not have its agency, and hence its not enough to hide its participation.
• As all entries are correlated, group differential privacy adds noise with standard deviation ≈ T / , where T is the length of the chain; this destroys all utility.
In contrast, in Section 4 we show an -Pufferfish mechanism which will add noise approximately equal to the mixing time over , and thus offer both privacy and utility for rapidly mixing chains. . . , n} -so the adversary cannot tell if each person i has flu or not. Θ is a set of models that describe the spread of flu; a plausible θ ∈ Θ is a tuple (G θ , p θ ) where G θ = (X, E) is a graph of personal interactions, and p θ is a probability distributions over the connected components of G θ . As a concrete example, G θ could be an union of cliques C1, . . . , C k , and p θ could be the following distribution on the number N of infected people in each clique Ci: P (N = j) = e 2j / |C i | i=0 e 2i , j = 0, . . . , |Ci|. Similarly, for the flu status example, we have:
• Both differential privacy and coupled worlds privacy add noise with standard deviation ≈ 1/ to the number of infected people. This will hide whether an Alice participates in the data, but if flu is contagious, then it is not enough to hide evidence of Alice's flu status. Note that unlike differential privacy, as the decision to participate is made at group level, Alice has no agency over whether she participates, and hence we cannot argue it is enough to hide her participation.
• Group differential privacy will add noise proportional to the size of the largest connected component; this may result in loss of utility if this component is large, even if the "average spread" of flu is low.
Again, we can achieve Pufferfish privacy by adding noise proportional to the "average spread" of flu which may be less noise than group differential privacy. For a concrete numerical example, see Section 3.
Guarantee Against Close Adveraries
A natural question is what happens when we offer Pufferfish privacy with respect to a distribution class Θ, but the adversary's beliefθ does not lie in Θ. Our first result is to show that the loss in privacy is not too large ifθ is close to Θ conditioned on each secret si ∈ S, provided closeness is quantified according to a measure called max-divergence. Definition 2.3 (max-divergence). Let p and q be two distributions with the same support. The max-divergence D∞(p||q) between them is defined as:
For example, suppose p and q are distributions over {1, 2, 3} such that p assigns probabilities {1/3, 1/2, 1/6} and q assigns probabilities {1/2, 1/4, 1/4} to 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Then, D∞(p||q) = log 2. Max-divergence belongs to the family of Renyi-divergences [6] , which also includes the popular Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Notation. Given a belief distribution θ (which may or may not be in the distribution class Θ), we use the notation θ |s i to denote the conditional distribution of θ given secret si.
Theorem 2.4. Let M be a mechanism that is -Pufferfish private with respect to parameters (S, Q, Θ) and suppose that Θ is a closed set. Suppose an adversary has beliefs represented by a distributionθ / ∈ Θ. Then,
The conditional dependence on si cannot be removed unless additional conditions are met. To see this, suppose θ places probability mass {0.9, 0.05, 0.05} andθ places probability mass {0.01, 0.95, 0.04} on databases D1, D2 and D3 respectively. In this case, max{D∞(θ||θ), D∞(θ θ)} = log 90. Suppose now that conditioning on si tells us that the probability of occurrence of D3 is 0, but leaves the relative probabilities of D1 and D2 unchanged. Then θ |s i places probability mass {0.9474, 0.0526} whileθ |s i places probability mass {0.0104, 0.9896} on D1 and D2 respectively. In this case, max{D∞(θ |s i ||θ |s i ), D∞(θ |s i θ |s i )} = log 91.0962 which is larger than max{D∞(θ||θ), D∞(θ θ)}.
Additional Notation
We conclude this section with some additional definitions and notation that we will use throughout the paper.
This means that changing one record out of n in a database changes the L1 norm of the query output by at most L.
For example, if F (X1, . . . , Xn) is a (vector-valued) histogram over records X1, . . . , Xn, then F is 2-Lipschitz in the L1 norm, as changing a single Xi can affect the count of at most two bins.
We use the notation Lap(σ) to denote a Laplace distribution with mean 0 and scale parameter σ. Recall that this distribution has the density function:
e −|x|/σ . Additionally, we use the notation card(S) to denote the cardinality, or, the number of items in a set S.
A GENERAL MECHANISM
While a number of mechanisms for specific Pufferfish instantiations are known [20, 18] , there is no mechanism that applies to any general Pufferfish instantiation. We next provide the first such mechanism. Given a database represented by random variable X, a Pufferfish instantiation (S, Q, Θ), and a query F that maps X into a scalar, we design mechanism M that satisfies -Pufferfish privacy in this instantiation and approximates F (X).
Our proposed mechanism is inspired by the Laplace mechanism in differential privacy; the latter adds noise to the result of the query F proportional to the sensitivity, which is the worst case distance between F (D) and F (D ) where D and D are two databases that differ in the value of a single individual. In Pufferfish, the quantities analogous to D and D are the distributions P (F (X)|si, θ) and P (F (X)|sj, θ) for a secret pair (si, sj), and therefore, the added noise should be proportional to the worst case distance between these two distributions according to some metric.
Wasserstein Distances. It turns out that the relevant metric is the ∞-Wasserstein distance -a modification of the Earthmover's distance used in information retrieval and computer vision. Definition 3.1 (∞-Wasserstein Distance). Let µ, ν be two probability distributions on R, and let Γ(µ, ν) be the set of all joint distributions with marginals µ and ν. The ∞-Wasserstein distance between µ and ν is defined as:
Intuitively, each γ ∈ Γ(µ, ν) is a way to shift probability mass between µ and ν; the cost of a shift γ is: max (x,y)∈support(γ) |x − y|, and the cost of the min-cost shift is the ∞-Wasserstein distance. It can be interpreted as the maximum "distance" that any probability mass moves while transforming µ to ν in the most optimal way possible. A pictorial example is shown in Figure 1 . 
The Wasserstein Mechanism
The main intuition behind our mechanism is based on this interpretation. Suppose for some (si, sj) and θ, we would like to transform P (F (X)|si, θ) to P (F (X)|sj, θ). Then, the maximum "distance" that any probability mass moves is
and adding Laplace noise with scale W i,j,θ / to F will guarantee that the likelihood ratio of the outputs under si and sj lies in [e − , e ]. Iterating over all pairs (si, sj) ∈ Q and all θ ∈ Θ and taking the maximum over W i,j,θ leads to a mechanism for the entire instantiation (S, Q, Θ).
The full mechanism is described in Algorithm 1, and its privacy properties in Theorem 3.2. Observe that when Pufferfish reduces to differential privacy, then the corresponding Wasserstein Mechanism reduces to the Laplace mechanism; it is thus a generalization of the Laplace mechanism.
for all (si, sj) ∈ Q and all θ ∈ Θ such that P (si|θ) = 0 and
Example. Consider a Pufferfish instantiation of the flu status application. Suppose that the database has size 4, and Θ = {(G θ , p θ )} where G θ is a clique on 4 nodes, and p θ is the following symmetric joint distribution on the number N of infected individuals: In this case, the parameter W in Algorithm 1 is 2, and the Wasserstein Mechanism will add Lap(2/ ) noise to the number of infected individuals. As all the Xi's are correlated, the sensitivity mechanism with Group Differential Privacy would add Lap(4/ ) noise, which gives worse utility.
Performance Guarantees
Theorem 3.2 (Wasserstein Privacy). The Wasserstein Mechanism provides -Pufferfish privacy in the framework (S, Q, Θ).
Utility. Because of the extreme generality of the Pufferfish framework, it is difficult to make general statements about the utility of the Wasserstein mechanism. However, we show that the phenomenon illustrated by the flu status example is quite general. When X is written as X = (X1, . . . , Xn) where Xi is the i-th individual's private value, and the goal is to keep each individual's value private, the Wasserstein Mechanism for Pufferfish never performs worse than the Laplace mechanism for the corresponding group differential privacy framework. The proof is in the Appendix B.1.
Theorem 3.3 (Wasserstein Utility). Let (S, Q, Θ)
be a Pufferfish framework, and let G be the corresponding group differential privacy framework (so that G includes a group G for each set of correlated individuals in Θ). Then, for a L-Lipschitz query F , the parameter W in the Wasserstein Mechanism is less than or equal to the global sensitivity of F in the G-group differential privacy framework.
A MECHANISM FOR BAYESIAN NET-WORKS
The Wasserstein Mechanism, while general, may be computationally expensive. We next consider a more restricted setting where the database X can be written as a collection of variables X = (X1, . . . , Xn) whose dependence is described by a Bayesian network, and the goal is to keep the value of each Xi private. This setting is still of practical interest, as it can be applied to physical activity monitoring and power consumption data.
The Setting
Bayesian Networks. Bayesian networks are a class of probabilistic models that are commonly used to model dependencies among random variables or vectors, and include popular models such as Markov Chains and trees. A Bayesian network is described by a set of variables X = {X1, . . . , Xn} (where each Xi is a scalar or a vector) and a directed acyclic graph G = (X, E) whose vertices are variables in X. Since G is directed acyclic, its edges E induce a parent-child relationship parent among the nodes X. The probabilistic dependence on X induced by the network can be written as:
For example, Figure 2 shows a Bayesian Network on 4 variables, whose joint distribution is described by:
A node Xi may have more than one parent, and as such these networks can describe complex probabilistic dependencies.
Figure 2: A Bayesian Network on four variables.
The Framework. Specifically, we assume that the database X can be written as X = {X1, . . . , Xn}, where each Xi lies in a bounded domain X . Let s i a denote the event that Xi takes value a. The set of secrets is S = {s i a : a ∈ X , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}, and the set of secret pairs is
. . , n}}. We also assume that there is an underlying known Bayesian network G = (X, E) connecting the variables. Each θ ∈ Θ that describes the distribution of the variables is based on this Bayesian network G, but may have different parameters.
For example, the Pufferfish instantiation in Example 1 will fall into this framework, with n = T and G a Markov Chain X1 → X2 → . . . XT .
Notation. We use X with a lowercase subscript, for example, Xi, to denote a single node in G, and X with an uppercase subscript, for example, XA, to denote a set of nodes in G. For a set of nodes XA we use the notation card(XA) to denote the number of nodes in XA.
The Markov Quilt Mechanism
The main insight behind our mechanism is that if nodes Xi and Xj are "far apart" in G, then, Xj is largely independent of Xi. Thus, to obscure the effect of Xi on the result of a query, it is sufficient to add noise proportional to the number of nodes that are "local" to Xi plus a correction term to account for the effect of the distant nodes. The rest of the section will explain how to calculate this correction term, and how to determine how many nodes are local.
First, we quantify how much changing the value of a variable Xi ∈ X can affect a set of variables XA ⊂ X, where Xi / ∈ XA and the dependence is described by a distribution θ in a class Θ. To this end, we define the max-influence of a variable Xi on a set of variables XA under a distribution class Θ as follows.
Definition 4.1 (max-influence).
We define the maxinfluence of a variable Xi on a set of variables XA under Θ as:
Here X is the range of any Xj. The max-influence is thus the maximum max-divergence between the distributions XA|Xi = a, θ and XA|Xi = b, θ where the maximum is taken over any pair (a, b) ∈ X × X and any θ ∈ Θ. If XA and Xi are independent, then the max-influence of Xi on XA is 0, and a large max-influence means that changing Xi can have a large impact on the distribution of XA. In a Bayesian network, the max-influence of any Xi and XA can be calculated given the probabilistic dependence.
Our mechanism will attempt to find large sets XA such that Xi has low max-influence on XA under Θ. The naive way to do so is through brute force search, which takes time exponential in the size of G. We next show how structural properties of the Bayesian network G can be exploited to perform this search more efficiently.
Markov Blankets and Quilts. For this purpose, we provide a second definition that generalizes the Markov Blanket, a standard notion in probabilistic graphical models [21] . The Markov Blanket of a node Xu in a Bayesian network consists of its parents, its children and the other parents of its children, and the rest of the nodes in the network are independent of Xu conditioned on its Markov Blanket. We define its generalization, the Markov Quilt, as follows.
Definition 4.2 (Markov Quilt).
A set of nodes XQ, Q ⊂ {1, . . . , n} in a Bayesian network G = (X, E) is a Markov Quilt for a node Xi if the following conditions hold: 1. Deleting XQ partitions G into parts XN and XR such that X = XN ∪ XQ ∪ XR and Xi ∈ XN . 2. For all xR ∈ X card(X R ) , all xQ ∈ X card(X Q ) and for all a ∈ X , P (XR = xR|XQ = xQ, Xi = a) = P (XR = xR|XQ = xQ). Thus, XR is independent of Xi conditioned on XQ.
Intuitively, XR is a set of "remote" nodes that are far from Xi, and XN is the set of "nearby" nodes; XN and XR are separated by the Markov Quilt XQ. Observe that unlike Markov Blankets, a node can have many Markov Quilts. Figure 3 shows an example. We also allow the "trivial Markov Quilt" with XQ = ∅, XN = X and XR = ∅.
Suppose we would like to release the result of a L-Lipschitz scalar query F while protecting a node Xi. If we can find a Markov Quilt (XN , XQ, XR) such that the max-influence of Xi on XQ under Θ is at most δ, then, it is sufficient to add Laplace noise to F with scale parameter L·card(XN )/( −δ). This motivates the following mechanism, which we call the Markov Quilt Mechanism. To protect Xi, we search over a set SQ,i of Markov Quilts for Xi and pick the one which requires adding the least amount of noise. We then iterate over all Xi and add to F the maximum amount of noise needed to protect any Xi; this ensures that the private values of all nodes are protected. Details are presented in Algorithm 2, and Theorem 4.3 establishes its privacy properties.
Vector-Valued Functions. The mechanism can be easily generalized to vector-valued functions. If F is L-Lipschitz with respect to L1 norm, then from Proposition 1 of [8] , adding noise drawn from L · σmax · Lap(1) to each coordinate of F guarantees -Pufferfish privacy.
Theorem 4.3 (Markov Quilt Mechanism Privacy).
If F is L-Lipschitz, and if each SQ,i contains the trivial quilt XQ = ∅ (with XN = X, XR = ∅) , then the Markov Quilt Mechanism preserves -Pufferfish privacy in the instantiation (S, Q, Θ) described in Section 4.1.
Composition
Unlike differential privacy, Pufferfish privacy does not always compose [20] , in the sense that the privacy parameter may not decay gracefully as the same data (or related 
data) is used in multiple privacy-preserving computations. We show below that the Markov Quilt Mechanism does compose under certain conditions. We believe that this property makes the mechanism highly attractive. To prove the theorem, we define active Markov Quilt X * Q,i for a node Xi. 
Case Study: Markov Chains
Algorithm 2 can still be computationally expensive, especially if the underlying Bayesian network is complex and the set Θ is large and unstructured. In this section, we show that when the underlying graph is a Markov Chain, the mechanism can be made more efficient.
The Setting. We use the same setting as Example 1 that was described in detail in Section 2.2. We assume that there are k activities so that the state space X = {1, . . . , k}. Thus each θ ∈ Θ corresponds to a tuple (q θ , P θ ) where q θ is a k ×1 vector that describes the distribution of the first state and P θ is a k × k transition matrix. Sources of Inefficiency. There are three potential sources of computational inefficiency in the Markov Quilt Mechanism. First, searching over all Markov Quilts in a set is inefficient if there are a large number of quilts. Second, calculating the max-influence of a fixed quilt is expensive if the probabilistic dependence between the variables is complex, and finally, searching over all θ ∈ Θ is inefficient if Θ is large and unstructured. We show below how to mitigate the computational complexity of all three sources for Markov Chains. First we show how to exploit structural information to improve the computational efficiency of the first two. Next we propose an approximation using tools from Markov Chain theory that will considerably improve the computational efficiency of searching over all θ ∈ Θ. The improvement preservesPufferfish privacy, but might come at the expense of some additional loss in accuracy.
Exploiting Structural Information
First, we show how to exploit structural information to improve the running time.
Bounding the Number of Markov Quilts. Technically, the number of Markov Quilts for a node Xi in a Markov Chain of length T is exponential in T . Fortunately however, Lemma 4.6 shows that for the purpose of finding the quilt with the lowest score for any Xi, it is sufficient to search over only O(T 2 ) quilts. The proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 4.6. In the setting of Section 4.4, let the set of Markov Quilts SQ,i be as follows:
Consider any Markov Quilt (XN , XQ, XR) for Xi that may or may not lie in SQ i . Then, the score of this quilt is greater than or equal to the score of some (X N , X Q , X R ) in SQ,i.
Calculating the max-influence. Consider the max-influence of a set of variables XQ on a variable Xi under a fixed θ ∈ Θ. Calculating it may be expensive if the probabilistic dependency among the variables in XQ and Xi is complex under θ. We show below that for Markov Chains, this max-influence may be computed relatively efficiently. Suppose XQ = {Xi−a, X i+b }, and recall that a state can take values in X = {1, . . . , k}. Then, we can write:
+ max
+ max Algorithm MQMExact. Thus, using structural properties of Markov Chains gives a more efficient instantiation of the Markov Quilt Mechanism that we describe in Algorithm 3.
We remark that to improve efficiency, instead of searching over all O(T 2 ) Markov Quilts for a node Xi, we search only over Markov Quilts whose endpoints lie at a distance ≤ from Xi. Since there are O(
2 ) such Markov Quilts, this reduces the running time if
T . Concretely, consider using Algorithm MQMExact on our running example with = T . For θ1, a search over each Xi gives that X8 has the highest score, which is 13.0219, achieved by Markov Quilt {X3, X13}. For θ2, X6 has the highest score, 10.6402, achieved by the Markov Quilt {X10}. Thus, the algorithm adds noise Z ∼ Lap(13.0219 × L) to the exact query value.
Running Time Analysis. A naive implementation of Algorithm 3 would run in time O(T 2 |Θ|( k 3 + T k 2 )). However, we can use the following observations to speed up the algorithm considerably. 
/*all quilts with end-points at distance ≤ plus the trivial quilt */ for all Markov Quilts XQ ∈ SQ,i do Calculate e {θ} (XQ|Xi) from (5) if e {θ} (XQ|Xi) < then
First, observe that for a fixed θ, we can use dynamic programming to compute and store all the probabilities P (Xi|θ), P (Xi|Xi−a) and P (X i+b |Xi) together in time O(T k 3 ). Second, note that once these probabilities are stored, the rest is a matter of maximization; for fixed Xi, Markov Quilt XQ and θ, we can calculate e {θ} (XQ|Xi) from (5) Additional optimizations may be used to improve the efficiency even further. In Appendix C.4, we show that if Θ includes all possible initial distributions for a set of transition matrices, then we can avoid iterating over all initial distributions by a direct optimization procedure. Finally, another important observation is that when the initial distribution under θ is the stationery distribution of the Markov Chainas can happen when data consists of samples drawn from a Markov process in a stable state, such as, household electricity consumption in a steady state -then for any i ∈ [a, T −b], the max-influence e {θ} ({Xi−a, X i+b }|Xi) depends only on a and b and is independent of i. This eliminates the need to conduct a separate search for each i, and further improves efficiency by a factor of T .
Approximating the max-influence
Unfortunately, Algorithm 3 may still be computationally inefficient when Θ is large. In this section, we show how to mitigate this effect by computing an upper bound on the max-influence under a set of distributions Θ in closed form using tools from Markov Chain theory. Note that now we can no longer compute an exact score; however, since we use an upper bound on the score, the resulting mechanism remains -Pufferfish private.
Definitions from Markov Chain Theory. We begin with reviewing some definitions and notation from Markov Chain theory that we will need. For a Markov Chain with transition matrix P θ , we use π θ to denote its stationary distribution [1] . We define the time reversal Markov Chain corresponding to P θ as follows.
Definition 4.7 (time-reversal).
Let P θ be the transition matrix of a Markov Chain θ. If π θ is the stationery distribution of θ, then, the corresponding time-reversal Markov Chain is defined as the chain with transition matrix P * θ where: P * θ (x, y)π θ (x) = P θ (y, x)π θ (y).
Intuitively, P * θ is the transition matrix when we run the Markov process described by P θ backwards from XT to X1.
In our running example, for both θ1 and θ2, the timereversal chain has the same transition matrix as the original chain, i.e., P * θ 1 = P θ 1 , P * θ 2 = P θ 2 . We next define two more parameters of a set Θ of Markov Chains and show that an upper bound to the max-influence under Θ can be written as a function of these two parameters. First, we define π min Θ as the minimum probability of any state under the stationary distribution π θ of any Markov Chain θ ∈ Θ. Specifically,
In our running example, the stationary distribution of the transition matrix for θ1 is [0. Additionally, we define gΘ as the minimum eigengap of P θ P * θ for any θ ∈ Θ. Formally, gΘ = min
In our running example, the eigengap for both P θ 1 P * θ 1 and P θ 2 P * .
The proof is in the Appendix. Observe that the irreducibility and aperiodicity conditions may be necessarywithout these conditions, the Markov Chain may not mix, and hence we may not be able to offer privacy.
Results similar to Lemma 4.8 can be obtained for Markov Quilts of the form XQ = {Xi−a} or {X i+b } as well. Finally, in the special case that the chains are reversible, a tighter upper bound may be obtained; these are stated in Lemma C.1 in the Appendix.
Lemma 4.8 indicates that when Θ is parametrized by gΘ and π min Θ , (an upper bound on) the score of each XQ may thus be calculated in O(1) time based on Lemma 4.8. This gives rise to Algorithm 4. Like Algorithm 3, we can again improve efficiency by confining our search to Markov Quilts where the local set XN has size at most .
Running Time Analysis. A naive analysis shows that Algorithm 4 has a worst case running time of O(T 2 ) -T iterations to go over all Xi, O(
2 ) Markov Quilts per Xi, and O(1) time to calculate an upper bound on the score of each quilt. However, the following Lemma shows that this running time can be improved significantly when Θ has some nice properties. * , then, the optimal Markov Quilt for the middle node X T /2 of the chain is of the form XQ = {X T /2 −a , X T /2 +b } where a + b ≤ 4a * . Additionally, the maximum score σmax = σ T /2 . Lemma 4.9 implies that for long enough chains, it is sufficient to search over Markov Quilts of length = 4a * , and only over Xi = X T /2 ; this leads to a running time of O((a * ) 2 ), which is considerably better and independent of the length of the chain. 
/*all quilts with end-points at distance ≤ plus the trivial quilt */ for all Markov Quilts XQ in SQ,i do Calculate eΘ(XQ|Xi) from Lemma 4.
Utility. We conclude with an utility analysis of Algorithm 4. The proof is in the Appendix. Theorem 4.10 implies that the noise added does not grow with T and the relative accuracy improves with more and more observations. A careful examination of the proof also shows that the amount of noise added is an upper bound on the mixing time of the chain. Thus if Θ consists of rapidly mixing chains, then Algorithm 4 provides both privacy and utility.
EXPERIMENTS
We next demonstrate the practical applicability of the Markov Quilt Mechanism when the underlying Bayesian network is a discrete time homogeneous Markov chain and the goal is to hide the private value of a single time entry -in short, the setting of Section 4.4. Our goal in this section is to address the following questions:
1. What is the privacy-utility tradeoff offered by the Markov Quilt Mechanism as a function of the privacy parameter and the distribution class Θ? 2. How does this tradeoff compare against existing baselines, such as [14] and Group-differential privacy? 3. What is the accuracy-run time tradeoff offered by the MQMApprox algorithm as compared with MQMExact?
These questions are considered in three different contexts -(a) a small problem involving a synthetic dataset generated by a two-state Markov Chain, (b) a medium-sized problem involving real physical activity measurement data and a four-state Markov Chain, and (c) a large problem involving real data on power consumption in a single household over time and a fifty-one state Markov Chain.
Methodology
Experimental Setup. Our experiments involve the Pufferfish instantiation of Example 1 described in Section 2.2. To ensure that results across different chain lengths are comparable, we release a private relative frequency histogram over states of the chain which represents the (approximate) fraction of time spent in each state. This is a vector valued query, and is 2 T -Lipschitz in its L1-norm. For our experiments, we consider three values of the privacy parameter that are representative of three different privacy regimes -0.2 (high privacy), 1 (moderate privacy), 5 (low privacy). All run-times are reported for a desktop with a 3.00 GHz Intel Core i5-3330 CPU and 8GB memory.
Algorithms. Our experiments involve four mechanisms that guarantee -Pufferfish privacy -GroupDP, GK16, MQMApprox and MQMExact.
GroupDP is a simple baseline that assumes that all entries in a connected chain are completely correlated, and therefore adds Lap(1/ ) noise to each bin. GK16 is the algorithm proposed by [14] , which defines and computes an "influence matrix" for each θ ∈ Θ. The algorithm applies only when the spectral norm of this matrix is less than 1, and the standard deviation of noise added increases as the spectral norm approaches 1. We also use two variants of the Markov Quilt Mechanism -MQMExact and MQMApprox.
Simulations
We first consider synthetic data generated by a binary Markov Chain of length T = 100 with states {0, 1}; the setup is chosen so that all algorithms are computationally tractable when run on reasonable classes Θ. The transition matrix of such a chain is completely determined by two parameters -p0 = P (Xi+1 = 0|Xi = 0) and p1 = P (Xi+1 = 1|Xi = 1), and its initial distribution by a single parameter q0 = P (X1 = 0). Thus a distribution θ ∈ Θ is represented by a tuple (q0, p0, p1), and a distribution class Θ by a set of such tuples. To allow for effective visualization, we represent the distribution class Θ by an interval [α, β] which means that Θ includes all transition matrices for which p0, p1 ∈ [α, β] and all initial distribution q in the 2-dimensional probability simplex. When 0 < p0, p1 < 1, the chain is guaranteed to be aperiodic, irreducible and reversible, and we can use the approximation from Lemma C.1 for MQMApprox. We use the optimization procedure described in Appendix C.4 to improve the efficiency of MQMExact. Finally, since the histogram has only two bins, it is sufficient to look at the query
To generate synthetic data from a family Θ = [α, β], we pick p0 and p1 uniformly from [α, β], and an initial state distribution uniformly from the probability simplex. We then generate a state sequence X1, . . . , XT of length T from the corresponding distribution. For ease of presentation, we restrict Θ to be intervals where β = 1 − α, and vary α from in 0.1 to 0.4. We vary in {0.2, 1, 5}, repeat each experiment 500 times, and report the average error between the actual F (X) and its reported value. For the run-time experiments, we report the average running time of the procedure that computes the scale parameter for the Laplace noise in each algorithm; the average is taken over all θ = (p0, p1) in a grid where p0, p1 vary in {0.1, 0.11, . . . , 0.9}. Figure 4 (upper row) shows the accuracy results, and Table 2 (Column 2) the run-time results for = 1. The values for GroupDP have high variance and are not plotted in the figure; these values are around 5, 1, 0.2 respectively. As expected, for a given , the errors of GK16, MQMApprox and MQMExact decrease as α increases, i.e, the distribution class Θ becomes narrower. When α is to the left of the black dashed line in the figure, GK16 does not apply as the spectral norm of the influence matrix becomes > 1; the position of this line does not change as a function of . In contrast, MQMApprox and MQMExact still provide privacy and reasonable utility. As expected, MQMExact is more accurate than MQMApprox, but requires higher running time. Thus, the Markov Quilt Mechanism applies to a wider range of distribution families than GK16; in the region where all mechanisms work, MQMApprox and MQMExact perform significantly better than GK16 for a range of parameter values, and somewhat worse for the remaining range.
Real Data
We next apply our algorithm to two real datasets on physical activity measurement and power consumption. Since these are relatively large problems with large state-spaces, it is extremely difficult to search over all Markov Chains in a class Θ, and both GK16 as well as MQMExact become highly computation intensive. To ensure a fair comparison, we pick Θ to be a singleton set {θ}, where θ = (q θ , P θ ); here P θ is the transition matrix obtained from the data, and q θ is its stationary distribution. For MQMApprox, we use from Lemma 4.9, while for MQMExact we use as the length of the optimal Markov Quilt that was returned by MQMApprox.
Physical Activity Measurement
We use an activity dataset provided by [11, 12, 10] , which includes monitoring data from a study of daily habits of 40 cyclists, 16 older women, and 36 overweight women. The dataset includes four activities -active, standing still, standing moving and sedentary -for all three groups of partic- Table 2 : Running time (in seconds) of an optimized algorithm that calculates the scale parameter of the Laplace noise (averaged over 5 runs). = 1.
ipants, 1 and thus the underlying θ is a four-state Markov Chain. Activities are recorded about every 12 seconds for 7 days when the participants are awake, which gives us more than 9, 000 observations per person on an average in each group. To address missing values, we treat gaps of more than 10 minutes as the starting point of a new independent Markov Chain. Observe that this improves the performance of GroupDP, since the noise added is Lap(M/T ), where M is the length of the longest chain. For each group of participants, we calculate a single empirical transition matrix P θ based on the entire group; this P θ is used in the experiments.
For this application, we consider two tasks -aggregate and individual. In the aggregate task, the goal is to publish a private aggregated relative frequency histogram 2 over participants in each group in order to analyze their comparative activity patterns. While in theory this task can be achieved with differential privacy, this gives poor utility as the group sizes are small. In the individual task, we publish the relative frequency histogram for each individual and report the average error across individuals in each group. Table 1 summarizes the L1 errors for the three groups and both tasks for = 1. For the aggregate task, we also report the error of a differentially private release (denoted as DP). Note that the error of the individual task is the average L1 error of each individual in the group. Figure 4 (lower row) presents the exact and private aggregated relative frequency histograms for the three groups. Table 2 (Columns 2-4) presents the time taken to calculate the scale parameter of the Laplce noise for each group of participants; as this running time depends on both the size of the group as well as the activity patterns, larger groups do not always have higher running times.
The results in Table 1 show that the utilities of both MQMApprox and MQMExact are significantly better than that of GroupDPfor all datasets and tasks, and are significantly better than DP for the aggregated task. As expected, MQMExact is better than MQMApprox, but has a higher running time. We also find that GK16 cannot be applied to any of the tasks, since the spectral norm of the influence matrix is > 1; this holds for all as the spectral norm condition does not depend on the value of . Figure 4 (lower row) shows the activity patterns of the different groups: the active time spent by the cyclist group is significantly longer than the other two groups, and the sedentary time spent by overweight women group is the longest. These patterns are visible from the private histograms published by MQMApprox and MQMExact, but not necessarily from those published by GroupDP. Table 3 : L1 error of relative frequency histogram for electricity consumption data. Reported values are averaged over 20 random trials.
Electricity Consumption
We use data on electricity consumption of a single household in the greater Vancouver area provided by [26] . Power consumption (in Watt) is recorded every 1 minute for about two years. Missing values in the original recording have been filled in before the dataset is published. We discretize the power values into 51 intervals, each of length 200(W), resulting in a Markov chain with 51 states of length T ≈ 1, 000, 000. Our goal again is to publish a private approximation to the relative frequency histogram of power levels. Table 3 reports the L1 errors of the four algorithms on electricity power dataset for different values, and Table 2 the times required to calculate the scale parameter. We again find that GK16 does not apply as the spectral norm condition is not satisfied. The error of GroupDP is very large, because the data forms a single Markov chain, and the number of states is relatively large. We find that in spite of the large number of bins, MQMApprox and MQMExact have high utility; for example, even for = 0.2, the per bin error of MQMExact is about 0.25 percent, and for = 1, the per bin error is 0.04 percent. Finally, while the running time of MQMExact is an order of magnitude higher than MQMApprox, it is still manageable (< 5 minutes) for this problem.
Discussion
We now reconsider our initial questions. First, as expected, the experiments show that the utility of GK16 and both versions of Markov Quilt Mechanism decreases with decreasing and increasing size of Θ. The utility of GroupDP does not change with Θ and is not very high; again this is to be expected as GroupDP depends only on the worstcase correlation. Overall the utility of both versions of the Markov Quilt Mechanism improve for longer chains.
Comparing with GK16, we find that for synthetic data, the Markov Quilt Mechanism applies to a much wider range of distribution families; in the region where all mechanisms work, MQMApprox and MQMExact perform significantly better than GK16 for a range of parameter values, and somewhat worse for the remaining range. For the two real datasets we consider, GK16 does not apply. We suspect this is because the influence matrix in [14] is calculated based on local transitions between successive time intervals (for example, Xt as a function of Xt−1); instead, the Markov Quilt Mechanism implicitly takes into account transitions across periods (for example, how X t+k as a function of Xt). Our experiments imply that this spectral norm condition may be quite restrictive in practical applications.
Finally, our experiments show that there is indeed a gap between the performance of MQMExact and MQMApprox, as well as their running times, although the running time of MQMExact still remains manageable for relatively large problems. Based on these results, we recommend using MQMExact for medium-sized problems where the state space is smaller (and thus computing the max-influence is easier) but less data is available, and MQMApprox for larger problems where the state space is larger but there is a lot of data to mitigate the effect of the approximation.
CONCLUSION
We present a detailed study of how Pufferfish may be applied to achieve privacy in correlated data problems. We establish robustness properties of Pufferfish against adversarial beliefs, and we provide the first mechanism that applies to any Pufferfish instantiation. We provide a more computationally efficient mechanism for Bayesian networks, and establish its composition properties. We derive a version of our mechanism for Markov Chains, and evaluate it experimentally on a small, medium and a large problem on time series data. Our results demonstrate that Pufferfish offers a good solution for privacy in these problems.
We believe that our work is a first step towards a comprehensive study of privacy in correlated data. There are many interesting privacy problems -such as privacy of users connected into social networks and privacy of spatio-temporal information gathered from sensors. With the proliferation of sensors and "internet-of-things" devices, these privacy problems will become increasingly pressing. We believe that an important line of future work is to model these problems in rigorous privacy frameworks such as Pufferfish and design novel mechanisms for these models.
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APPENDIX A. PUFFERFISH PRIVACY DETAILS
Proof. (of Theorem 2.4) Since Θ is a closed set, for finite D, there must exist some distribution in Θ that achieves ∆. Call this θ. The ratio
is equal to:
Bu Pufferfish, the last ratio in (8) ∈ [e − , e ]. Since the outcome of M given X is independent of the generation process for X, we have
Similarly, we can show that this ratio is also ≥ e −∆ . Applying the same argument to the second ratio in (8) along with simple algebra concludes the proof.
B. WASSERSTEIN MECHANISM PROOFS
Proof. (Of Theorem 3.2) Let (si, sj) be secret pair in Q such that that P (si|θ), P (sj|θ) > 0. Let µ i,θ ,µ j,θ be defined as in the Wasserstein Mechanism. Let γ * = γ * (µ i,θ , µ j,θ ) be the coupling between µ i,θ and µ j,θ that achieves the ∞-Wasserstein distance.
Let M denote the Wasserstein mechanism. For any w, the ratio
is:
where the first step follows from the definition of the Wasserstein mechanism, the second step from properties of the Laplace distribution, and the third step because for all W ≥ W∞(µ i,θ , µ j,θ ), we have
An analogous statement also holds for µ j,θ (s). Observe that in the last step of (9), |s−t| ≤ W in both the numerator and denominator; therefore we have that the right hand side of (9) 
where the last step follows as γ * (t, s) = 0 when |s − t| > W .
A similar argument shows that
≤ e , thus concluding the proof.
B.1 Comparison with Group DP
Consider a group-DP framework parameterized by a set of groups G = (G1, . . . , G k ). For each k, we use XG k ⊂ X to denote the records of all individuals in G k , and we define D k = {(x, y)|x, y differ only by records in XG k }.
Definition B.1 (Global Sensitivity of Groups). We define the global sensitivity of a query F with respect to a group G k as: ∆G k F = max (x,y)∈D k |F (x) − F (y)|. The Global Sensitivity of F with respect to an a Group DP framework G is defined as: ∆GF = max k∈{1,...,m} ∆G k F.
Analogous to differential privacy, adding to the result of query F Laplace noise with scale parameter ∆GF/ will provide in -group DP in the framework G [9] .
We begin by formally defining a group DP framework corresponding to a given Pufferfish framework. Suppose we are given a Pufferfish instantiation (S, Q, Θ) where data X can be written as X = {X1, · · · , Xn}, Xi ∈ X , the secret set S = {s i a : a ∈ X , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} where s i a is the event that Xi = a, and the set of secret pairs Q = {(s i a , s i b ) : a, b ∈ X , a = b, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}. In the corresponding Group DP framework G, G1, . . . , Gm is a partition of {1, . . . , n}, such that for any p = q, Xi and Xj are independent in all θ ∈ Θ if i ∈ Gp, j ∈ Gq.
Proof. (Of Theorem 3.3) All we need to prove is W ≤ ∆GF , where W is the noise parameter in the Wasserstein Mechanism and ∆GF is the global sensitivity of F in the group-DP framework G.
For any secret pair (s i a , s i b ) ∈ Q, let k be such that i ∈ G k . Let XT = X \ XG k . For all realizations xT of XT , define ν i,a,θ,x T = P (F (X)|Xi = a, XT = xT , θ) and ν i,b,θ,x T = P (F (XS, XT = xT )|Xi = b, θ).
Since any Xj ∈ XT is independent of Xi, for all realizations xT of XT , we have P (XT = xT |Xi = a, θ) = P (XT = xT |Xi = b, θ) = P (XT = xT |θ). And we have µ i,a,θ = x T P (XT = xT |θ)ν i,a,θ,x T , and similarly, µ i,b,θ = x T P (XT = xT |θ)ν i,b,θ,x T . As these two probability distributions are mixtures of the ν i,a,θ,x T s and ν i,b,θ,x T s with the same mixing coefficients, by Lemma B.2, we have:
By definition, ∞-Wasserstein of two distributions is upper bounded by the range of the union of the two supports,
be two collections of probability distributions, and let {ci} n i=1 be mixing weights such that ci ≥ 0, i ci = 1. Let µ = i ciµi and ν = i ciνi be mixtures of the µi's and νi's with shared mixing weights {ci}. Then W∞(µ, ν) ≤ max i∈{1,...,n} W∞(µi, νi).
Proof. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let γi be the coupling between µi and νi that achieves W∞(µi, νi). Let the support of µ, ν be S, and that of µi, νi be Si. We can extend each coupling γi to have value 0 at (x, y) ∈ S\Si.
We can construct a coupling γ between µ and ν as follows: γ(x, y) = n i=1 ciγi(x, y). Since this is a valid coupling, W∞(µ, ν) ≤ max (x,y)∈A |x − y| where A = {(x, y)|γ(x, y) = 0}. And we also know that max (x,y)∈A |x−y| = maxi W∞(µi, νi). Therefore we have W∞(µ, ν) ≤ max i∈{1,...,n} W∞(µi, νi). For any w, we have
is at most:
Since F is L-Lipschitz, for a fixed X * R∪Q , F (X) can vary by at most L · card(X * N ); thus for x * R∪Q , the first ratio in (12) is ≤ e −e Θ (X * Q |X i ) . Since X * R is independent of Xi given X * Q , the second ratio in (12) is at most e e Θ (X * Q |X i ) . The theorem follows.
Proof. (of Theorem 4.4) Let L k be the Lipschitz coefficient of F k . Consider any secret pair (Xi = a, Xi = b) ∈ Q. In a Pufferfish instantiation (S, Q, Θ), given and SQ,i, the active Markov Quilt X * Q,i for Xi used by the Markov Quilt Mechanism is fixed. Therefore all M k use the same active Markov Quilt, and we denote it by XQ, with corresponding XR, XN . Let Z k ∼ Lap(σ (k) ) denote the Laplace noise added by the Markov Quilt Mechanism M k to F k (D). For any k, since XQ is the active Markov Quilt, we have
. Let XR∪Q = XR ∪ XQ. Then for any
, we have
Let X N \{i} = XN \Xi. The first ratio in (13) equals to
Let F k (a, x N \{i} , xR∪Q) denote the value of F k (X) with Xi = a, XR∪Q = xR∪Q and X N \{i} = x N \{i} . Since F k (X)'s are fixed given a fixed value of X, and Z k 's are independent, the above equals to
Since P (X N \{i} |XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = a), P (X N \{i} |XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = b) are probability distributions which integrate to 1, the above equals to
Notice that F k can change by at most L k · card(N ) when X N \{i} and Xi change. So for any x N \{i} , x N \{i} ,
Therefore the first ratio in (13) is upper bounded by Π k e −e Θ (X Q |X i ) . As has been analyzed in the proof to Theorem 4.3, the second ratio is bounded by e e Θ (X Q |X i ) . Combining the two ratios together, (13) is upper bounded by Π k e −e Θ (X Q |X i ) e e Θ (X Q |X i ) ≤ e K , and the theorem follows.
C.2 Markov Chains
Proof. (of Lemma 4.6) Consider a Markov Quilt (XN , XQ, XR) of Xi. XQ = X Q,l ∪XQ,r where all nodes in X Q,l have index smaller than i, and all nodes in XQ,r have index larger than i. When XQ is non-empty, there are three cases.
First, both X Q,l and XQ,r are non-empty. Then there exist positive integers a, b, such that Xi−a ∈ X Q,l is the node with the largest index in X Q,l , and X i+b is the node with the smallest index in XQ,r. Since X Q,l \Xi−a is independent of Xi given Xi−a, and XQ,r\X i−b is independent of Xi given X i−b , eΘ(XQ|Xi) = eΘ({Xi−a, X i+b }|Xi). Also, all nodes in {Xi−a+1, . . . , X i+b−1 } should be included in XN , since they are not independent of Xi given XQ, and thus
The second case is when XQ,r is empty but X Q,l is not. Still, there exists positive integer a such that Xi−a ∈ X Q,l is the node with largest index in X Q,l . Since X Q,l \Xi−a is independent of Xi given Xi−a, eΘ(XQ|Xi) = eΘ({Xi−a}|Xi). Since all nodes in {Xi−a+1, . . . , XT } are not independent of Xi given XQ, they should be included in XN , and thus card(XN ) ≥ T − i + a. Now consider X Q = {Xi−a} ∈ SQ,i with X N = {Xi−a+1, . . . , XT }. The above implies that σ(X Q ) ≤ σ(XQ). The third case is when X Q,l is empty but XQ,r is not; this is analogous to the second case.
Before proving Lemma 4.8, we overload the notation gΘ in (7) to capture the case where Θ consists of irreducible, aperiodic and reversible Markov chains:
2 min θ∈Θ min{1 − |λ| : P θ x = λx, |λ| < 1}, θ ∈ Θ reversible min θ∈Θ min{1 − |λ| : P θ P * θ x = λx, |λ| < 1}, otherwise. Now we restate Lemma 4.8 to provide a better upper bound when P θ , ∀θ ∈ Θ is irreducible, aperiodic, and reversible.
Lemma C.1. Let π min Θ be as in (6) , and gΘ be as in (14) . , and for XQ = ∅, eΘ(XQ|Xi) = 0.
The main ingredient in the proof of Lemma 4.8 is from the following standard result in Markov Chain theory [1] .
Lemma C.2. Consider an aperiodic, irreducible k-state discrete time Markov Chain with transition matrix P . Let π be its stationary distribution and let π min = minx π(x). Let P * be the time-reversal of P , and let g be defined as follows: g = 2 min{1 − |λ| : P x = λx, |λ| < 1}, P is reversible min{1 − |λ| : P P * x = λx, |λ| < 1}, otherwise. This lemma, along with some algebra and an Bayes Rule, suffices to show the following.
Lemma C.3. For any Θ consists of irreducible and aperiodic Markov chains, let π min Θ be defined as in (6) , and gΘ be defined as in (14) . Proof. (of Lemma 4.8) Consider XQ of the form {Xi−a, X i+b }. For any θ, any x, x and any xQ, by conditional independence, log
is equal to: log P (X i+b = x i+b |Xi = x, θ) P (X i+b = x i+b |Xi = x , θ) + log P (Xi−a = xi−a|Xi = x, θ) P (Xi−a = xi−a|Xi = x , θ)
By Lemma C.3, this is at most 2 log for any x, x , xi−a, x i+b .
Moreover, when XQ = {Xi−a}, the first term disappears and log P (X Q =x Q |X i =x,θ) P (X Q =x Q |X i =x ,θ) is at most 2 log 
C.3 Fast MQMApprox
Lemma C.4. In Algorithm MQMApprox, suppose there exists an i ∈ {1, . . . , T }, such that σi = minX Q ∈S Q,i σ(XQ) is achieved by XQ = {Xi−a, X i+b } with i − a ≥ 1, i + b ≤ T . Then, max j∈{1,...,T } σj = σi.
Proof. (Of Lemma C.4) Let XQ = {xi−a, x i+b } be the quilt with the lowest score for node Xi. Pick any other node X i . If both i − a ≥ 1 and i + b ≤ T , then {X i −a , X i +b } is a quilt for X i with score σi. Since σ i is the minimum score over all quilts of X i , σ i ≤ σi.
Otherwise, at least one of the conditions i − a ≥ 1 or i + b ≤ T hold. Suppose i − a ≥ 1. Then, consider the quilt X Q = {X i −a } for X i . Let XN (resp. X N ) be the set of local nodes of Xi (resp. X i ) corresponding to XQ (resp. X Q ). Since i + b ≥ T + 1, we have card(X N ) = T − i + a ≤ a + b − 1 = card(XN ). This implies that eΘ(X Q |X i ) is equal to: Consider any Markov Quilt X Q (with corresponding X N and X R ) with card(X N ) ≥ 4a * − 2. Since max-influence is always non-negative, we have σ(X Q ) = card(X N ) −e Θ (X Q |X i ) ≥ 4a * −2 ≥ σ(XQ), and thus any Markov Quilt X Q with card(X N ) ≥ 4a * − 2 has score no less than that of XQ = {Xi−a * , Xi+a * }. If X Q is of the form {X i−a } or {X i+b }, then since T ≥ 8a * , we have card(X N ) ≥ 4a * . Therefore the optimal Markov Quilt for Xi is of the form {Xi−a, X i+b } with a+b ≤ 4a * . Combining this with Lemma C.4 concludes the proof.
C.4 MQMExact Optimization
We show that MQMExact can be expedited further if Θ is of the form: Θ = ∆ k × P, where P is a set of transition matrices, and ∆ k is the probability simplex over k items. In other words, Θ includes tuples of the form (q, P ) where q ranges over possible initial distributions and P belongs to a set P of transition matrices.
For any P ∈ P, let ΘP = {(P, q) ∈ Θ}. Let P j be P raised to the j-th power. From (5), eΘ P (XQ|Xi) is equal to: max x,x ∈X log max q (q P i−1 )(x ) (q P i−1 )(x)
P a (xi−a, x ) .
Since (q P i−1 )(x) = q P i−1 (:, x), for i > 1, we have max q (q P i−1 )(x ) (q P i−1 )(x) = maxP i−1 (:, x ) q P i−1 (:, x) = max y P i−1 (y, x )
where the the maximum is achieved by q = ey * , y * = arg maxy . This implies that we only need to iterate over all transition matrices P instead of conducting a grid search over Θ, which further improves efficiency.
